CROSSROADS: WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN PENNSYLVANIA
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT'S EMPLOYMENT TRILOGY
SHARON DIETRICH

When applying principles of employment law, evaluating whether a dismissal of
an employee was legally proper is not the
same as making a normative judgment about
the fairness of the employer's action. Unfortunately, there are many situations in
which an employee can be "unfairly" but
"legally" discharged from his or her job.

This difference can be illustrated using three
examples. Let us suppose both a layperson
and an attorney were asked their opinions
about the propriety of these dismissals.
In the first example, a person is fired
from her job because she involuntarily
missed work while serving on a jury, a duty
which she was compelled to perform. In the
second, a person is terminated in retaliation
for having reported certain workplace accidents as required by law. Finally, a third
person is discharged for buying the employer's merchandise at a discount in a transaction handled by another employee, even
though the company's "employee handbook"
said that she was entitled to make the purchase in this manner.
The average person probably thinks that
none of these people was lawfully terminated. Twenty years ago, the opposite
answer was equally obvious to the lawyer.
That is because the Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania, along with every other state in the
country, applied (and in many cases continues to apply) the presumption' of "employment at will" to contracts between employers
and employees.
The essence of the employment at will
doctrine is a presumption that an employment relationship will continue for an indefinite period of time and can be terminated by
either the employer or the employee at any
time, for any reason, or for no reason at
all.' However, because the doctrine is
merely a legal inference, rather than an
immutable rule of law, 3 it does not apply if

the employer and employee have agreed to
a contract that specifies different terms
regarding the length of employment or
reasons for termination of the relationship.'
Therefore, about the only questions an
attorney would have had to ask 20 years ago
were whether each of the employees either
had negotiated a formal contract with his or
her employer or was covered by a collective
bargaining agreement.' If there were a
collective bargaining agreement, it probably
would limit discharges to those for which
there was "just cause," as that term is construed by labor arbitrators on a case-by-case
basis.' In the rare case where an employee
had entered into an explicit contract directly
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with the employer, the terms of that contract
would be consulted to determine under what
circumstances a termination was allowed.'
But in the typical employment relationship,
which is governed by neither type of contract, the attorney would state with confidence that each of the three employees in
our example could be fired, unless protected
by a statute providing a remedy for discharge based on those reasons.
Today, a lawyer presented with these
three scenarios would scramble to the library
before answering. The reason for such
caution is the progressive development,
during the past twenty years, of tor and
contract9 forms of recourse for employees
without contracts, so-called "employees at
will" who have been "wrongfully discharged."
Throughout the country, the
highest court in almost every state has considered the viability of wrongful discharge
theories.'" The most common of these theories are the tort of discharge in violation of
public policy and contract claims based upon
the policies contained in employee handbooks.
The causes of this veritable revolution
in employment law are debatable. The
wrongful discharge phenomenon may be
related to a judicial climate which has nurtured new common law theories of liability
in recent years, most notably in the personal
injury and products liability areas." The
decline of union membership throughout the
country has also doubtlessly played a role.
Significantly fewer employees are covered
by contractual provisions that limit the employer's discretion to discharge, prompting
employees to press new causes of action in
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the courts.'2 In addition, as employee handbooks began to replace collective bargaining
agreements as the documents most often
defining the employment relationship, the
courts may have been compelled to acknowledge that reexamination of the rules governing termination of employees at will was
needed. (The courts needed to decide, for
example, if employees with handbooks were
still employees at will.)
Pennsylvania's role in this revolution
has been curious. In its 1974 opinion in
Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,3 the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court rendered one
of the earliest and most influential decisions
in the wrongful discharge area. During the
next fifteen years, however, that court did
not consider another wrongful discharge
case, even while its sister courts throughout
the nation were deciding public policy tort
and employee handbook issues. In the
absence of guidance from the supreme court,
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania developed wrongful discharge principles for the
state during that period. Finally, within an
eight-month period beginning in 1989, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided three
cases which permit insight into its attitudes
about the wrongful discharge theories of the
public policy violation tort, the employee
handbook claim, and promissory estoppel."
Although the first two decisions by the court
express support for the public policy tort and
employee handbook claim, the third opinion
raises doubts about the viability of both
claims. The third opinion also indicates that
the court may have reservations about the
inroads made into the employment at will
doctrine which will affect subsequent wrong-
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ful discharge rulings in Pennsylvania.
This article examines the development
of wrongful discharge law in Pennsylvania,
focusing on the pronouncements of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and their effects. Section I reviews the development of
wrongful discharge law up to the trilogy of
decisions by the supreme court in 1989. It
begins by looking at turn of the century
decisions in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court adopted and defined the employment
at will presumption. The section then examines the supreme court's ground-breaking
Geary decision, in which the court suggested, in response to a challenge to the
employment at will doctrine, that a cause of
action could arise when an employee is
discharged for reasons violating "public
policy."'5 The section concludes with a
survey of the development of common law
doctrines for wrongful discharge by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court during the
fifteen-year period following Geary, during
which the supreme court did not consider
any cases that raised common law exceptions
to employment at will.
Section II of this article analyzes the
reasoning and scope of the supreme court's
three recent decisions, in which it ended its
post-Geary silence on wrongful discharge.
Finally, Section III discusses what the future
most likely holds for Pennsylvania employees without employment contracts who seek
remedies for their dismissals. It explains
how those opinions, when read together,
have created some doubts about the viability
of wrongful discharge remedies where there
were none before. This section identifies
which issues have been resolved by the
trilogy of decisions, what questions remain
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open, and what can be expected of the supreme court's next foray into this area of the
law.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW
CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF
TERMINATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN

PENNSYLVANIA.

A. Development of the Employment at
Will Doctrine
A common misperception about the
employment at will doctrine is that it came
into existence with the birth of the
master/servant relationship. In fact, the
doctrine has only been recognized since the
turn of the century."' The first opinion of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to endorse
the doctrine was Henry v. Pittsburgh& Lake
Erie R.R.'7 In Henry, a railroad employee
brought suit after he was suspended and
eventually discharged as a result of an investigation into irregularities within his department. In response to the plaintiff's argument that his employer could not suspend
him maliciously, unnecessarily and without
probable cause," the court replied that an
employer "may discharge an employee with
or without cause, at pleasure, unless restrained by some contract; so that .
malice and want of probable cause [do not]
have anything to do with the case. "'
The employment at will doctrine was
reaffirmed in subsequent decisions of the
supreme court. These decisions, however,
made clear that this doctrine was a presumption that could be rebutted by a showing that
the parties had different intentions regarding
the terms of employment.' Through the
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larger part of the century, then, employees
could not challenge their dismissals under
Pennsylvania common law unless they could
demonstrate that they had employment
agreements which guaranteed employment
for a fixed duration, or which limited the
permissible reasons for discharge.
B. Geary and the Birth of Wrongful
Discharge
The long-standing principle that employees at will could not sue employers
under the common law for damages arising
from their loss of employment was directly
confronted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in 1974. In Geary v. United States
Steel Corp., an employee who conceded
that he had an "at will" relationship with his
former employer brought suit after he was
discharged, allegedly for expressing reservations to his superiors about the safety of a
product sold by the company. Geary argued
that the court should allow him to assert a
tort cause of action for damages arising from
his loss of employment, despite the fact that
he lacked an employment contract. Recognizing that it was being "beckon[ed] into
uncharted territory" because of the dearth of
precedent for nonstatutory causes of action
for employees at will, the court acknowledged that it was presented with the question of "whether the time has come to impose judicial restrictions on an employer's
power of discharge."'

The court indicated that the controlling
Pennsylvania law, which had been set forth
in Henry, weighed against the imposition of
common law restraints upon the discharge of
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at-will employees.'
It noted that the
weight of authority in other states was in
accordance with Pennsylvania's presumption
of employment at will. ' The court recognized, however, that "economic conditions
have changed radically since the time of
Henry

. .

. [and t]he huge corporate enter-

prises which have emerged in this century
[now] wield an awesome power over their
employees.""
Against this historical background, the
court considered Mr. Geary's two theories
of recovery: (1) that United States Steel had
discharged Mr. Geary with the specific
intent to harm him, and (2) that his dismissal
by the employer violated public policy. The
court acknowledged that Pennsylvania law
had accepted torts imposing liability in other
contexts for conduct motivated by a specific
intent to cause harm.' The court conceded
that Mr. Geary's "analogy to cases involving
the malicious abuse of recognized rights
seems apt enough."'

Despite its recognition that the "specific
harm" tort theory was susceptible of being
extrapolated into the employment context,
the court was troubled by the allegations of
Mr. Geary's complaint, which, as the court
read them, did not establish a claim of
specific intent to cause harm. The court
found it persuasive that Geary's complaint
alleged that he had been discharged after the
product about which he had complained was
removed from the market. Under these
circumstances, the court indicated, the inference to be drawn from Mr. Geary's allegations was that he had "made a nuisance of
himself" with his complaints and was discharged to preserve peace in the company.
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The court concluded that Mr. Geary's allegations could not permit an inference that he
was terminated with the specific motivation
of causing him harm.'
The court also evaluated Mr. Geary's
argument that he was entitled to damages for
his discharge based on considerations of
public policy. While observing that his
argument would be compelling for an expert
with responsibility for making judgments on
the safety of United States Steel's products,
the court concluded that, as a salesperson,
Mr. Geary lacked both the qualifications and
the job description of a safety expert. The
court refused to shelter Mr. Geary with
public policy considerations merely because
his intentions were good.' Noting the interest of the company in preventing disruption of its internal operating procedures, the
court decided that a nonstatutory cause of
action was not justified by public policy
considerations in such a case.
Despite its conclusion that no "public
policy violation" tort could be recognized in
the case before it, the court gave signs that
it would accept such a cause of action in a
case with different facts. It declined to
reject the reasoning of decisions in California and Indiana which had adopted causes of
action for discharges violating clear public
policies.3' In addition, the court observed
that the argument for constitutional protections of an employer's right to discharge free
of restrictions had long ceased to have any
force.

32

Most significantly, the court expressed
agreement with the concept that considerations of public policy could limit an employer's actions in dismissing employees at
will:
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It may be granted that there are
areas of an employee's life in
which his employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into
one of these areas by virtue of the
employer's power of discharge
might plausibly give rise to a cause
of action, particularly where some
recognized facet of public policy is
threatened.'
The court concluded its opinion by declining
to "define in comprehensive fashion" the
limits on an employer's privilege to discharge, and holding that an employee at will
cannot sue his employer in wrongful discharge where the reason for termination does
not violate a clear mandate of public pol4
icy.
Three justices dissented from the majority opinion in Geary, two without joining
any opinion. In the lone dissenting opinion,
Justice Roberts read the majority opinion as
"conced[ing] the employment relationship
is
a proper subject for judicial action."35
However, he criticized the court for not
going far enough, characterizing the majority's posture as "blind acceptance of the
employer's absolute right of discharge" in
the face of a social and economic reality in
which employees have become highly vulnerable because of their increasing dependence on employment by others.'
Despite Justice Roberts' criticism, the
majority's opinion in Geary represents a
clear break with the court's prior precedents,
which held that an employee at will could be
discharged for any or no reason. The court
affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Geary's claims
because it concluded that he had not pled
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factual allegations making out the legal
theories upon which he purported to rely.
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that
the tort theories advanced by Mr. Geary
appeared applicable in the employment
context, even though it declined to expound
upon them in the absence of facts making
out the causes of action. According to one
commentator, "Geary was among the first
five cases in the country to admit even the
possibility of an exception to the doctrine of
employment at will."37 Geary would, however, be the last statement of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on common law wrongful discharge actions for fifteen years.
C. Post-GearyDevelopments in Wrongful
DischargeLaw
In retrospect, the supreme court's Geary
decision was a cornerstone in the foundation
of a reformulation of employment law which
would soon take hold throughout the country.' In the decade since Geary, common
law causes of action for non-union employees have gained widespread acceptance,
carving out significant exceptions to the
general principle of at will employment.'
The exceptions most commonly accepted
throughout the United States have been the
"public policy violation" tort addressed in
Geary, and a contract cause of action based
upon employee handbooks. In the fifteen
year period following Geary, the Pennsylvania Superior Court wrestled with both theoies, as well as a promissory estoppel theory
premised upon oral representations of the
employer.
During the period leading up to the
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supreme court's recent decisions, the superior court credited Geary with establishing
common law causes of action for discharges
motivated by an employer's specific intent to
harm the employee, and for discharges
contrary to public policy. ' However, it
refused to find that a public policy violation
tort was implicated in the vast majority of
cases it examined.' To date, the superior
court has found a public policy violation to
be implicated in only four alleged situations:
(1) where an employee was fired for reporting an incident to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, as required by a federal safety
statute; '2 (2) where an employee was discharged for refusing to take a polygraph
test;' (3) where an applicant was not hired
because of criminal convictions which had
been unconditionally pardoned;" and (4)
where an employee was discharged for
serving jury duty.'
The superior court also has been repeatedly presented with the theory that discharges of employees at will could be restricted
by representations in handbooks distributed
to them by employers. In Richardson v.
Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., its first
decision examining the contractual effect of
an employee handbook, the court indicated
that an employer's failure to comply with its
employee handbook did not give rise to a
wrongful discharge claim. ' In Banas v.
Matthews Int'l Corp.,' the superior court,
sitting en banc, ruled that an employee could
not bring a wrongful discharge claim based
upon a handbook which did not contain a
provision limiting the reasons for discharge
to "just cause." The court declined, however, to decide whether a handbook which
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did contain such a provision would have
contractual force. Although some decisions
after Banas suggested that an employee
handbook could not have contractual
force, ' subsequent opinions acknowledged
that handbooks could create claims for
wrongful discharge.' The superior court's
analysis in its most recent handbook cases
(prior to the supreme court decisions) concentrated on whether the language of a
handbook would cause a "reasonable employee" to believe that the employment at
will relationship had been modified?
Finally, during this period the superior
court examined the question of whether an
employee could assert a promissory estoppel
claim based upon oral representations of an
employer. In Paul v. Lankenau Hospital,"'
the court concluded that despite the absence
of a guarantee that the employee would be
fired only for just cause, the employee could
pursue a promissory estoppel claim based
upon an implied promise that he would not
be dismissed for exercising permission given
him by the employer. The court in Paul
also held that termination from employment
could give rise to a defamation claim. 2
This review of the superior court's
decisions in common law employment cases
between Geary and the next supreme court
cases reveals that it fashioned a wrongful
discharge jurisprudence of which judicial
restraint is a preeminent characteristic.
Although it recognized the specific intent to
harm tort, the public policy violation tort,
and the employee handbook contract claim,
it construed these theories narrowly so that
few plaintiffs were able to state a claim.
The court's acceptance of promissory estoppel and defamation claims in Paul may have
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signaled a departure from the conservatism
with which it had previously proceeded in
the wrongful discharge context. The super:
ior court's role as the primary architect of
Pennsylvania's wrongful discharge doctrines
ended, however, with the supreme court's
sudden reemergence in the field.
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME
COURT'S TRILOGY OF EMPLOYMENT

DECISIONS

A. The Public Policy Violation Claim:
Clay v. Advanced Computer
Applications, Inc.
The majority opinion in Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc." addressed a narrow issue with respect to the
application of the public policy violation
tort: whether employees discharged as a
result of sex discrimination can state a cause
of action for wrongful discharge when they
have not exhausted administrative remedies
under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(PHRA).'
Although most of the opinion
focuses on the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the PHRA's administrative
exhaustion requirements, the Clay decision
also provides insight into the attitudes of the
members of the court toward the public
policy violation tort.
The plaintiffs in Clay, spouses who had
worked for the same employer, alleged that
they had both been discharged after the
woman rejected sexual advances by a male
management-level employee. Rather than
filing sexual discrimination charges with the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
(PHRC), as required by the PHRA, the
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plaintiffs brought suit under a common law
theory that their discharge violated public
policy." After examining the PHRA and
prior judicial interpretations of the legislative
intent embodied in that statute, the majority
held that the plaintiffs could not circumvent
the administrative requirements of the statute
by pursuing a common law remedy for
discrimination and dismissed the plaintiffs'
suit.'
Justice Flaherty's" majority opinion in
Clay did not by any means represent the
views of the entire court. Justices Stout and
McDermott did not participate in the decision of the case. Of the remaining four
justices, three expressed disagreement with
some of Justice Flaherty's pronouncements
about causes of action for wrongful discharge under the common law.
The majority opinion acknowledged that
a common law cause of action had been
recognized in Pennsylvania where dismissals
of employees at will threatened clear mandates of public policy. Justice Nix, concurring in judgment only, disagreed that a
common law cause of action exists for
wrongful discharge.' Rather, he characterized the language of Geary upon which the
superior court had relied to recognize the
public policy tort as "gratuitous dicta." "
Justice Nix agreed with the majority that the
case should be dismissed because, in his
opinion, "recognizing a wrongful discharge
action would be inimical to the continued
existence of at-will employment."'

Justice Zappala, joined by Justice
Larsen, wrote separately to express his
concern about a statement in the majority
opinion which suggested that dismissals for
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reasons of sex discrimination are not actionable under the common law."' In contrast
to Justice Nix, they described Geary as the
"seminal case" recognizing a wrongful
discharge exception to employment at
will. "' They further indicated that the
wrongful discharge cause of action would
continue to evolve and that a public policy
violation claim for sex discrimination might
be accepted in the future as the law developed.'
In summary, Clay made little headway
in the emergence of a supreme court jurisprudence of common law actions for wrongful discharge. Its narrow holding was that a
discharged employee cannot bring a public
policy violation suit for discrimination which
has a remedy under the PHRA. The decision revealed that at least four of the seven
members of the Court recognized a cause of
action for discharges violating public policy.
Justice Nix, however, denied that a cause of
action for discharges violating public policy
exists in Pennsylvania. Remarkably, Justice
Nix, the only current member of the supreme court who had taken part in the Geary
case, dissented without opinion in Geary.
Because the majority in Geary had affirmed
the nonsuit of the plaintiff's claims, Justice
Nix's dissent in that case seemed to mean
that he disagreed with the nonsuit and thus
recognized the validity of Mr. Geary's
causes of action. Although at the time it
was rendered, Justice Nix's opinion in Clay
appeared as nothing more than an interesting
footnote in the history of wrongful discharge
law in Pennsylvania, it came to play a surprisingly prominent role in a subsequent
supreme court decision.
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B. Claims Premised Upon Employee
Handbooks: Morosetti v. La. Land and
Exploration Co.
In Moroset" v. La. Land and Exploration Co.," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
confronted its first claim that an imputed
contract arose from an employer policy
communicated to employees.'
Although
Moroset" involved a claim for severance
benefits and not wrongful discharge, it
elucidated the supreme court's views regarding the contractual effect of employee
handbooks.
In Morosetti, the plaintiff employees
were presented with a choice between new
jobs or severance pay when the company
employing them was sold. Plaintiffs elected
to accept jobs with the purchasing company
but nevertheless brought suit for the severahce pay.' In his opinion for the majority,
Justice McDermott found that the only factual basis for the employees' claim for severance benefits was a policy manual maintained by the personnel manager of the
selling company that was not distributed to
the employees, and the employees' belief
that a policy on severance pay existed because of the past periodic payment of severance by management.'
In holding that the employees had no
contract entitling them to severance benefits,
the majority turned to "basic contract law,"
which dictates that an offer must be "intentional, definite in its terms, and communicated," in order to form the basis for an
agreement." The court found it persuasive
that the company did not tell employees
about its severance policy, and that all the
employees did not share the same expecta-
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tions regarding their entitlement to the benefits.69
Most significantly for wrongful discharge plaintiffs in Pennsylvania, the court's
opinion seemed to turn on the issue of the
employer's intent in promulgating a handbook. The majority opinion stated that "[a]
handbook distributed to employees as inducement for employment may be an offer
and its acceptance a contract."'

However,

the court qualified this statement by indicating that employers need not be bound by
their own policy "unless they communicate
that policy as part of a definite offer of
employment."7 In support of that proposition, the Court cited Richardson v. Charles
Coe Memorial Hosp.,' a decision in which
the superior court had rejected an employee
handbook. claim for wrongful discharge.
Justice Zappala filed a short concurring
opinion in addition to joining that of the
majority. He distinguished the Morosetti
severance pay policy, which had not been
distributed to employees, from employee
handbooks which had been disseminated.
Because Morosetti concerned uncommunicated policies of the employer, Justice
Zappala characterized the majority's statement regarding the potential contractual
effect of a handbook as "dicta" and "of no
precedential value. " '
The dissent of Justice Larsen began by
setting out the facts of the case in much
more detail than had the majority. On the
same day that the closing of the plant was
announced, the selling company distributed
a memorandum to the employees stating that
a formula for severance payment would be
communicated by June 1, 1984. The purchasing company began to hire former em-
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ployees of the selling company on May 27,
1984. After receiving a list from the purchasing company of all former employees
whom it did not hire, the selling company
distributed a memorandum on June 1, 1984
indicating that severance payments would be
made only to persons who had not been
rehired or made an offer of employment by
that date.7'
Using these facts, Justice
Larsen posited the issue before the court as
whether the "employee handbook" containing the severance payment policy created an
enforceable contractual obligation on behalf
of former "at will" employees.' He endorsed what he characterized as the "preferred position" regarding employee handbooks: when an employer by written policy
offers employees at will a benefit, the employer can unilaterally alter or eliminate the
policy only until the event triggering the
vesting of the benefit has occurred. In
support of this proposition, Justice Larsen
cited two opinions which had construed
handbooks as containing limits on an employer's right to dismiss employees at
will.'
Justice Larsen further disagreed with the
majority's finding that there had been no
"meeting of the minds" in this case. He
pointed out that contracts can be established
by conduct and oral words, as well as writings." Unlike the majority, Justice Larsen
found enough evidence to support a contract
for the severance benefits, relying on the
policy in the manual, the company's past
practice of paying severance to other employees, the employer/employee relationship
which suggested that the benefits were not
gratuities, and the fact that the employer had
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enjoyed a loyal workforce which had continued to serve it.'
Despite his dissent, Justice Larsen and
the Morosetti majority were not very far
apart in their analyses. The basis of their
disagreement was their respective evaluations
of whether the evidence adduced by the
plaintiffs, which did not include a distribution directly to the employees of the policy
at issue, was sufficient to constitute an offer
communicated by the employer. The most
important feature of Morosetti was that all
members of the court, with the exception of
Justice Zappala, appeared willing to acknowledge that an employee handbook could have
contractual effect. Morosetti implied that
subsequent decisions concerning employee
handbooks would address the circumstances
giving rise to valid claims, not the question
of whether such claims exist.
C. The Current "Last Word" on Wrongful
Discharge:Paul v. Lankenau Hospital
In a decision rendered on February 1,
1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
directly considered the viability of a common law wrongful discharge theory for the
first time since Geary. In Paul v. Lankenau
Hospital," the court was faced with the
question of whether a discharged employee
at-will could bring claims of promissory
estoppel and defamation against his former
employer for injuries suffered as a result of
his termination.
Dr. Paul, a Yugoslavian emigre, had
been employed by Lankenau Hospital from
1962 until 1980. On numerous occasions
throughout his tenure, Dr. Paul removed
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hospital equipment, most of which had been
discarded, which he either sold or sent to
Yugoslavia. The hospital did not contest
that Dr. Paul had been given permission to
take these items, with the exception of five
refrigerators, the last of the items removed.
The ensuing disagreement between Dr. Paul
and the hospital, over whether he had received permission to take the refrigerators,
resulted in Dr. Paul involuntarily signing a
letter of resignation.'
Dr. Paul brought suit against the hospital for wrongful discharge. Included in the
nine counts of Dr. Paul's complaint were
claims that the hospital was estopped from
discharging him for taking the refrigerators,
and that the discharge was defamatory.s"
The trial court permitted only Dr. Paul's
estoppel claim to go to the jury. In response
to special interrogatories, the jury found that
Dr. Paul had permission from the supervisor
of the supply room to take the refrigerators,
that Dr. Paul reasonably relied upon that
permission, that the hospital had not acted
reasonably in determining that Dr. Paul had
taken the equipment without permission, and
that Dr. Paul had not resigned voluntarily.
The jury followed its liability decision with
a damage award, which was partially remitted by the trial judge. '
Both parties appealed to the superior
court. After a panel of that court affirmed
the judgment below, the hospital successfully
sought reargument. The superior court en
banc affirmed the decision on the estoppel
count, as well as the nonsuit of seven of Dr.
Paul's other claims. The superior court
further determined that Dr. Paul's defamation claim had been improperly dismissed,
and that he should have had an opportunity
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to show the jury that his dismissal, which
was based upon an untrue allegation of theft,
supported the cause of action. The supreme
court granted allocatur' to consider the
hospital's arguments that Dr. Paul could not
state claims for promissory estoppel and
defamation, while it denied Dr. Paul's allocatur petition with respect to his nonsuited
claims. 8'
Justice Papadakos' majority opinion
began by acknowledging the argument that
the court's earlier decision in Geary represented a breakthrough for employees in the
recognition of limits to the doctrine of employment at will. He took pains, however,
to indicate that this view of Geary was
unwarranted. While conceding that Geary
held that some exceptions to employment-atwill might exist, particularly when public
policies are implicated, Justice Papadakos
observed that the court had not comprehensively defined those limits. The opinion
approvingly cited language from Geary
which reaffirmed the employment-at-will
presumption, and noted that the Geary court
had answered in the negative the "central
question" of "whether the time has come to
impose judicial restraints on an employer's
power of discharge".'
Justice Papadakos further commented
that Geary had been reaffirmed in Clay. He
quoted that portion of Clay in which the
majority had stated that exceptions to the
rule of employment at will had been recognized in "only the most limited of circumstances," such as public policy violations.
Most surprisingly, Justice Papadakos also
quoted Justice Nix's statement in Clay that
Geary had not recognized any cause of
action for wrongful dischargeY

HYBRID: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Having reviewed Geary and Clay, the
court stated that the analysis of those two
cases was dispositive in the case before it.
The court concluded that "[t]he doctrine of
equitable estoppel is not an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine. An employee
may be discharged with or without cause,
and our law does not prohibit firing an
employee for relying on an employer's
promise. " '
Nevertheless, neither the majority nor
the concurrence reached the merits of the
defamation issue. It concluded that Dr. Paul
had not properly preserved the issue, since
he made only a "boilerplate" ' assertion of
error in his post-trial filing, which failed to
satisfy the requirements of Pa. R. Civ. P.
227.1. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Zappala opined that Dr. Paul had adequately
preserved the defamation issue but that the
nonsuit of the claim by the trial court should
be affirmed because Dr. Paul's evidence did
not show a communication of the allegedly
defamatory statement.'
Paul, then, appears to resolve the issue
of whether an employee can bring a promissory estoppel claim for wrongful discharge
based upon oral representations. It clearly
vacates the superior court's opinion on the
defamation issue, without endorsing or
rejecting that discussion. Paul is equally
significant, however, for its repercussions on
other wrongful discharge theories, which are
discussed in the next section.
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III. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN PENNSYLVANIA AFTER PAUL

A. The Present and Futureof the Public
Policy Violation Tort
Clay indicated, by a four-to-one decision of the court, that the public policy
violation tort is actionable in Pennsylvania.
In so doing, it confirmed the conclusion that
had been reached by the superior court after
Geary. Despite Justice Nix's contrary opinion in Clay, the superior court continued to
recognize the public policy tort. In Field v.
Phila. Elec. Co.,

the superior court relied

upon Clay to find that a public policy violation claim had been pled, and further that
such actions had been recognized in Geary.
By quoting Justice Nix's opinion in Clay
as part of its reasoning in Paul, however,
the supreme court casts some doubt upon the
viability of the public policy tort. The
court's reliance in Paul on Justice Nix's
Clay opinion appears implicitly to endorse it.
Moreover, the positions on this issue of
Justice Cappy, who was elected to the Court
after the Paul decision, and Justice
Montemuro, who was appointed after Justice
McDermott's death, are still unknown.
Nevertheless, a repudiation of the public
policy theory by the supreme court seems
unlikely. Doing so would represent a retreat
from the very recent decision in Clay, in
which Justices Flaherty and Larsen both paid
homage to Geary as creating the cause of
action. The most plausible explanation for
the citation in Paul to Justice Nix's opinion
regarding the public policy tort is that Justice Nix, who joined the opinion of the
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majority in Paul, wished to have his view
acknowledged. Under these circumstances,
advocates should not neglect to make public
policy violation claims in anticipation of a
possible reversal of Clay.'
B. The Present and Future of the
Employee Handbook Claim
--Morosetti appears to do for employee

handbook claims what Clay did for public
policy violation claims: a majority of the
supreme court, in dictum, indicated that
contract claims based upon employee handbooks can be actionable.93 Justice Larsen
left no doubt that he will recognize an employee handbook claim for wrongful discharge.'
As noted above, however, Justice
Zappala explicitly declined to endorse the
majority's pronouncement about the contractual effect of an employee handbook. In
so doing, Justice Zappala at the least reserved his comment on the issue.9" In addition, Justice Zappala's opinion serves as a
reminder that Morosetti did not conclusively
resolve the issue of whether the court will
permit a cause of action to be stated for
wrongful discharge based upon an employee
handbook, since Morosetti dealt with severance benefits and did not rely upon an employee handbook.
The status of the employee handbook,
like that of the public policy tort, must be
reexamined in light of Paul. While employee handbooks are not mentioned in
Paul, the decision did deal with promissory
estoppel--the underlying contract theory
upon which several courts have premised
employee handbook claims.' The opinions
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of the superior court in Paul and Banas
illustrate this relationship between the two
theories.
In Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp.,9 the

employee handbook claim, rejected by the en
banc superior court, had been framed as a
promissory estoppel theory. In that case,
the plaintiff argued that he was wrongfully
discharged for doing what he had been given
permission to do: to make a gravestone for
himself in conformity with the policy contained in his employee handbook.'
Dr.
Paul, of course, made a similar claim successfully in the superior court--that he had
been fired for removing hospital equipment
which he had orally been given permission
to take. Both the concurrence and the dissent of the superior court in Paul rejected
attempts by the majority to distinguish Banas
and stated that Banas had effectively been
overruled.' Yet because the legal theories
of Banas and Paul are virtually indistinguishable, the supreme court's conclusion in
Paul that the plaintiff could not assert a
cause of action for promissory estoppel must
be construed as approving the result reached
in Banas.w No meaningful distinction can
be drawn between promises arising orally or
through a course of conduct and promises
written in employee handbooks. The irrelevance of any such distinction is particularly
clear in light of the court's categorical rejection of promissory estoppel claims in
Paul.0'°
Despite the demise of the promissory
estoppel theory, there are two doctrinal paths
around Paul that preserve the viability of
employee handbook claims. First, there is a
difference between promissory estoppel
claims based upon a specific promise not to
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discharge for particular reason,'" and promissory estoppel claims resting on a general
promise not to terminate an employee except
for "just cause." In Banas, for instance, the
majority opinion indicated that the latter
form of promissory estoppel claim might
state a claim for violating an employee
handbook, despite the court's rejection of the
Paul variety of promissory estoppel."
Even though the supreme court used unequivocal language in Paul to reject promissory estoppel claims in employment, the
court's own precedent creates an exception
for promissory estoppel claims for employThus, it is
ment of a certain duration.'
reasonable to expect that the supreme court
will permit a plaintiff to prevail on a promissory estoppel theory if the handbook contained a "just cause" provision.
Second, employee handbook claims
have routinely been accepted under an alternative contract theory; namely that of unilateral contract. This doctrine holds that a
contract has been created when the terms of
an offer provide for acceptance by performance and performance has been rendered. " In her dissent in Banas, Judge
Beck suggested that a unilateral contract is
created when the employer's offer of conditions of employment in the form of an employee handbook is accepted by the employee by beginning (or continuing) to work for
The majority of states
the employer."
which have acknowledged the employee
handbook claim have relied upon the unilateral contact analysis.'"
For the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
find that no wrongful discharge claim is
created by an employee handbook, it must
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decide against the enormous weight of authority in other states which accept such a
cause of action almost without exception. '
Given certain signs of disfavor toward
wrongful discharge causes of action appearing in Paul, the court may, in fact, be willing to take such a singular position. But, as
Morosettican be reconciled with Paul under
the alternate contract theories upon which an
employee handbook claim can be based, the
employee handbook claim continues to be
viable." The supreme court is expected to
resolve this issue if an opportunity is pre110
sented.
C. The Repercussions of the Paul Decision
The supreme court set out the primary
holding of Paul in clear and unequivocal
terms: "[tihe doctrine of equitable estoppel
is not an exception to the employment-at-will
This holding is important
doctrine.""'
because it conflicts with prior decisions
permitting the assertion of contract claims by
employees without a formal written contract.
More significant, however, is the lack of
receptivity to wrongful discharge claims
communicated by the four justices joining in
the opinion.
Simply put, the Paulopinion expresses
unwillingness by four members of the court
to favorably receive wrongful discharge
actions."' The court's narrow reading of
Geary greatly contributes to this perception,
by implicitly repudiating Geary's role as a
landmark wrongful discharge case. As
discussed above, an examination of Geary
reveals that it has played a pivotal role
within the context of the development of the
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public policy tort in Pennsylvania and other
states. The court's reading of Geary is also
overbroad. The court concluded that Geary
is dispositive on the question of whether an
employee can be fired for relying upon an
employer's promise." 3 While the opinion
presented only the theories of specific intent
to harm and the public policy tort, it did not
address any contract cause of action, nor did
it broadly repudiate theories not before the
court. Contrary to the court's reasoning, the
result in Paul was not required by Geary.
The court's inhospitality to wrongful
discharge actions is also conveyed through
its manner of disposing of the defamation
claim in Paul. Rather than reaching the
merits of the claim, the court vacated the
superior court's decision on the ground that
the issue had not been properly preserved.
The court characterized Dr. Paul's post-trial
submission of error as "boilerplate."" '
The court's unbending waiver analysis is
particularly remarkable because waiver was
not among the employer's issues in its allocatur petition, nor was it argued by the
employer in its briefs. By this disposition,
the court undermined the precedential authority of the superior court's opinion without reaching the merits.' Had it reached
the merits of Dr. Paul's claim, the court

would have been forced to acknowledge its
prior holding that an employer can defame a
former employee in a communication regarding the reasons for the employee's separation.' 6
The most disturbing aspect of Paul is
the court's manner of resolving the promissory estoppel issue. The perfunctory
rejection of that claim by incantation of
Geary is not, however, the only weakness in

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993

the court's analysis. The opinion is also
wholly silent on the inconsistency between
its holding and its prior decisions that recognized promissory estoppel actions brought by

employees. In Berlinerv. Bee Em Manufacturing,"' the court held that employees

who were led to believe that they would
hold their jobs as salesmen through the next
sales season could prevail by establishing the
elements of promissory estoppel. Earlier,
the court had affirmed the conclusion of the
superior court that an employment relationship could guarantee employment for a
"reasonable" time if the employee supplied
"sufficient additional consideration" over and
above his or her services as an employee."" The Paul court did not attempt
to reconcile either decision with its broad
holding."'
Finally, the court did not grapple with
the implications of its decision that the
employment at will rule bars a contract
claim (promissory estoppel). From the
beginning, the court conceived of the employment at will doctrine as a presumption
to be used when explicit contractual terms
were absent. This presumption could be
rebutted by a demonstration of different
contractual terms by the parties. By categorically rejecting the promissory estoppel
claim, the court, in effect, prohibits the
rebuttal of the presumption by an aggrieved
employee. The court has transformed the
presumption into an immutable principle
and, in so doing, has lost sight of the original understanding of the presumption of
employment at will.
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CONCLUSION

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
sudden involvement in wrongful discharge
issues is notable because of its long absence
from that field of state law. Its trilogy of
employment-related decisions, however, is
far from the last word on these issues, given
the important questions which remain. For
millions of Pennsylvania workers who are
not covered by collective bargaining agreements, the supreme court's future wrongful
discharge decisions will determine whether
employees will be entirely at the mercy of
their employers' termination decisions.
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See,
e.g., Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334, 337 (Pa. Super. 1988); Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 885;
Piper v.
Board of Trustees, 426 N.E.2d 262 (11. App. 1981).
106. Banas, 502 A.2d at 656-57.
107. See Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol.
Hosp.,
720 P. 2d 632 (Idaho 1986); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314 (Ill. 1987);
Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Johnston v. Panhandle Coop. Ass'n., 408
N.W.2d
261 (Neb. 1987); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Alroad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche,
Inc.,
491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987); Yartzoffv. Democrat-Herald
Publ.
Co., 576 P.2d 356 (Or. 1978); Small v. Springs Indus., 357 S.E. 2d 452 (S.C. 1987); Cook v. Heck's, 342
S.E.2d
453 (W.Va. 1986).
108. In addition to the cases cited in notes 76 and 96, supra, the following decisions accord contractual significance
to employee handbooks. Arco Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988); Leikvold v. Valley
View
Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc); Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 728 S.W.2d
501
(Ark. 1987); Washington Welfare Ass'n v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 613 (D.C. App. 1985); Young v. Cedar
County
Work Activity Ctr., 418 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1987); Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987);
Gates v.
Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982); Boudar v. E.G.&G., Inc., 742 P.2d 491 (N.M. 1987);
Mers
v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1985); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D.
1983);
Benoir v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 514 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1986); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 1985);
Mobil
Coal Producing v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
There are only two viable cases in courts of last resort which have refused to find employee handbooks
enforceable under certain circumstances. See Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982);
Johnson
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).
109. One recent superior court decision unequivocally held that an employee handbook will be construed
to be an
enforceable contract if a reasonable employee would interpret it as evidencing the employer's intent to supplant
the
presumption of an at-will relationship. See Ruzicki, 610 A.2d at 497. But as in the public policy violation
area,
the court has routinely found that the cases before it did not raise legally sufficient employee handbook claims.
See
Rutherford, 612 A.2d at 504 (no claim where manual was never distributed to the employees and contained
a
disclaimer that it was not intended as a legal contract); Ruzicki, 610 A.2d at 498 (no cause of action even
though
employee was not afforded progressive discipline as set forth in the handbook, where handbook contained
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disclaimer); Vincent, 582 A.2d 1370-71 (Pa. Super. 1990) (no evidence that policy was part of definite offer at time
of hire or later caused plaintiff to continue employment); Curran v. Children's Servs. Center, 578 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.
Super. 1990), allocaturdenied, 585 A.2d 468 (Pa. 1991) (no claim where handbook gave protections to permanent
employees, but plaintiff was a temporary employee at time of termination).
110. The supreme court had granted allocatur in such a case prior to deciding Morosetti, but that case was settled
prior to decision. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
I11. Pau, 569 A.2d at 348.
112. Indeed, the court's aversion to wrongful discharge was foreshadowed by its refusal to grant Dr. Paul's petition
for allocatur on his nonsuited claims while granting his employer's petition. See Paul, 553 A.2d 969 (Pa. 1988)
(granting the employer's petition); 554 A.2d 510 (Pa. 1988) (denying the plaintiff's petition).
113. See id.
114. Pau, 569 A.2d at 349.
115. See id.
116. See Bin v. Phila. Elec. Co., 167 A.2d 472, 474 (Pa. 1960).
117.

119 A.2d at 66 (Pa. 1956).

118. Lucacher v. Kerson, 45 A.2d 245, 247-48 (Pa. Super. 1946), aff'd, 58 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1946).
119. It is notable that the "additional consideration" theory has fared best of all wrongful discharge theories in
superior court since the supreme court's three decisions were rendered. In Scullion v. Emeco Indus., Inc., 580
A.2d 1356 (Pa. Super. 1990), allocaturdenied, 592 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1991), the court affirmed a jury verdict on the
ground that the plaintiffs evidence of additional consideration was sufficient to rebut the at-will presumption. The
plaintiff's evidence consisted of his refusing an increased salary from his previous employer, selling his house in
California, moving his family to Pennsylvania, purchasing a building lot, and receiving generous retirement benefits.
See id. at 1359. The jury's verdict was affirmed over a dissent which argued that the supreme court's holding in
Pau "is indicative of a decided preference to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature and not the courts."
Id. at 1362 n.1 (Olszewski, dissenting).
In Cashdollar v. Mercy Hosp., 595 A.2d 70 (Pa. Super. 1991), the superior court again concluded that the
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff was supported by sufficient evidence of additional consideration. In that case,
the evidence of additional consideration consisted of the employee's giving up secure, well-paying employment,
uprooting his pregnant wife and young child to move from Virginia to Pittsburgh, selling his home, and being the
target of the employer's persistent efforts to hire him. See id. at 73-4 and n.2.
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